A global carbon market? by Pollitt, Michael G.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Michael G. POLLITT
A global carbon market?
© The Author(s) 2019, July/2019
Abstract This paper explores the prospects for a global
carbon market as the centerpiece of any serious attempt to
reach the ambitious goal for greenhouse gas (GHG)
reductions set by climate scientists. My aim is to clarify
the extent to which we know what policy might best
support global decarbonisation. We begin by discussing
what we might mean by a global carbon market and its
theoretical properties. We then go on to discuss the EU
Emissions Trading System experience and the recent
experience with the Australian carbon tax. Next, we assess
recent carbon market initiatives in the US and in China.
My argument is that while establishing the amount of
emissions required and dividing it up acceptably between
countries requires an enormous scientific and international
negotiations effort, the economic instruments to deliver the
agreed targets are readily at hand.
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1 Introduction
Dealing with climate change caused by dangerous levels of
man-made greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is seen as one
of the most pressing global problems currently faced.
Climate scientists tell us that, in order to have a 50 %
chance of limiting the rise in global temperature to just 2
degrees (relative to 1850–1900) from 1990 levels, there
needs to be a global 40%–70% cut in carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2e) emissions
1) levels by 2050 relative to
2010 (see for example Allen et al., 2009 and IPCC,
2014).2) This has been translated into an approximately
80% target reduction in CO2e for advanced countries
relative to 19903). Otherwise there is a heightened risk of
dangerously high levels of global temperature rises that
will have difficult-to-predict impacts on the stability of the
global environment.
On the face of it this looks like a very challenging
situation that requires action on a scale that we have not
seen so far and that seems increasingly unlikely to happen
in the time frame identified. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997
led to initial agreement on action to reduce GHGs at the
global level, but was only ratified by 83 countries (out of
over 190), and only included quantified emissions
limitation or reduction objectives for a much smaller
group of industrialized countries (so called Annex 1
countries). Approximately 63% of emissions from these
advanced economies are accounted for by countries that
have ratified the Protocol.4) But more than a decade since
the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, annual GHG
emissions have not yet started to decline.5)
The prospects for a ‘Global Deal’ (Stern, 2008) on
emissions reduction seemed remote until the COP-21
conference in Paris of December 2015. At this conference
the United Nations (UN) did manage to get an agreement
to limit the global temperature rise to ‘well below 2°C’
between around 191 countries.6) As of February 2018, 175
countries representing 88% of global emissions have
ratified the agreement (though the US has notified its intent
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1) For simplicity, CO2e will be referred to as ‘carbon’ throughout the rest of this paper.
2) Global GHG emissions in 1990 were 38 Gt of CO2e, in 2010 they were 49 Gt CO2e (IPCC 2014, p.22). A 70% cut relative to 2010, is a 60% cut relative to
1990.
3) See for example: https://www.theccc.org.uk/2014/11/25/the-ipcc-report-and-the-uk-2050-target/, accessed 24 November 2015.
4) http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification.pdf
5) Annual global GHG emissions (excluding land use and forestry change) reportedly rose 0.5% in 2016 to a new record 49.3 Gt CO2e (see Olivier et al.,
2017).
6) http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf
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to withdraw).1) The agreement however is some way short
of a global agreement to actually limit emissions because it
involves unilateral voluntary commitments to action (so
called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions –
INDCs), which together do not collectively sum up to
policies that would achieve the required reduction in
emissions. The agreement does not specify mechanisms to
achieve the required reduction in emissions to meet the
stated temperature target but ‘recognizes the important role
of providing incentives for emission reduction activities,
including tools such as domestic policies and carbon
pricing’ (V.137). Arguably the success of the UN in Paris
was due to the fact that the agreement was focused on the
final target (of a global temperature reduction) rather than
anything more concrete around the mechanisms of how it
was to be achieved.
Against that backdrop, this paper explores the prospects
for a global carbon market as the centerpiece of any serious
attempt to reach the ambitious goal for GHG reductions set
by climate scientists. My aim is to clarify the extent to
which we know what policy might best support global
decarbonisation.
My starting point is that the policy solution to excessive
emissions of GHGs is actually well established in theory
and in very large scale experiments, specifically the
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).
These give some confidence that carbon emissions
reduction policy based around restricting the quantity of
emissions permits to the level suggested by climate
scientists would be the most sensible approach to
delivering the depths of emissions reductions that is
required.2)
Indeed, we should stop giving the impression that we do
not know what policy to put in place to deal with global
GHG emissions. Climate science may be constantly
evolving and contentious, but the economics of emissions
control is not. An example of this was the recent
suggestion that there needed to be a big increase in global
publicly funded renewable energy research and develop-
ment (RD+ D) expenditure, from $6 bn to $15 bn per year
for the next 10 years (under the ‘Global Apollo
Programme’)3). This type of proposal suggests that dealing
with decarbonisation is still primarily a research project.
On the contrary: it is already the case that significant
sums are being spent on renewable energy RD+ D. In
2017 the world spent an estimated $9.9 bn p.a. on
renewable energy RD+ D alone (Frankfurt School-UNEP
Centre/BNEF (2018) and has been close to this level since
2009. The IEA reports that 90% of public energy RD+ D
(out of budgets of $17 bn) was spent on non-fossil fuel
technologies in 20154). In the power sector, global RES
investment was significantly higher than in global fossil
investment in 2017 (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/
BNEF, 2018) and has been so for the past several years.
Within OECD countries the picture is even more striking
with perhaps 75% of power generation investment being
spent on zero carbon technologies over the period 2007–
2013 (World Economic Forum and Bain Consulting,
2015). A transition in the research base and in investment
is underway at least in electric power – these suggest that
the technological barriers to decarbonisation are being
addressed.
Instead my contention is that the way forward is that we
should (simply!) implement a reasonably comprehensive
set of quantity restrictions on CO2e, building on experience
with existing policies such as the EU ETS. While the path
to achieving this is difficult, the economic building blocks
are clear.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss what I
mean by a global carbon market and its theoretical
properties. Next, I discuss the EU ETS experience and
the recent experience with the Australian carbon tax. I then
go on to assess the evolving carbon market initiatives in the
US and in China. In my conclusions, I reflect on the overall
lessons from carbon pricing experience.
2 What do we mean by a global carbon
market?
2.1 Why price carbon?
At the heart of a carbon market is the idea that putting a
single price on CO2e emissions regardless of their source is
a good idea. Carbon pricing through a market has most
value in the early stages of decarbonisation. The market
can help with identifying the mix of sectors to decarbonise;
the mix of existing low carbon technologies per sector; the
role of demand side reduction and substitution; and with
guiding consumer and climate NGO pressure. A single
price of carbon is fundamentally about identification of
low cost decarbonisation options within a general
equilibrium (i.e., multiple interconnected markets) setting.
This sort of idea is in sharp contrast to a technology-based
1) https://cait.wri.org/source/ratification/#?lang = en&ratified = AL,DZ,AG,AR,AU,AT,BD,BB,BY,BZ,BJ,BO,BW,BR,BN,BG,BF,CM,CA,CF,CN,KM,CK,
CR,DK,DJ,DM,EE,EU,FM,FJ,FI,FR,GA,GM,DE,GH,GR,GD,GN,GY,HN,HU,IS,IN,ID,IE,IL,IT,CI,JP,JO,KZ,KI,LA,LU,MG,MY,MV,ML,MT,MH,MU,
MX,MC,MN,MA,NA,NR,NP,NZ,NE,NU,KP,NO,PK,PW,PS,PA,,AF,AD,AM,AZ,BH,BE,BT,BA,BI,KH,CV,TD,CL,HR,CU,CY,CZ,CD,DO,EC,EG,SV,
ET,GE,GT,HT,JM,KE,LV,LS,LI,LT,MK,MW,MR,MD,ME,MM,NL,NI,NG,PG,PY,PE,PH,PL,PT,QA,CG,RS,RO,RW,KN,LC,VC,WS,ST,SA,SN,SC,SL,
SG,SK,SI,SB,SO,ZA,KR,ES,LK,SD,SZ,SE,CH,SY,TJ,TH,BS,TL,TG,TO,TT,TN,TM,TV,UG,UA,AE,GB,US,UY,VU,VE,VN,ZM,ZW, accessed 28 Feb-
ruary 2018.
2) Indeed, one could go further and suggest that any other conceivable policy (or set of policies) seems to have no realistic prospect of adding up to a policy
strong enough to reach the required cuts in GHG emissions.
3) King et al. (undated).
4) See IEA (2017a, p.56).
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approach, which assumes both the efficacy of the
technology and the extent to which it should be
implemented. It is because at the whole economy level
we are unlikely to know how best to approach decarbo-
nisation that carbon pricing, rather than a technology
driven approach, is so valuable. Putting a price on
pollution is a policy that has wide support among
environmental economists because it directly tackles the
environmental externality involved in pollution and
because it has a good track record, especially when
contrasted with conventional command and control
approaches based on the mandating of particular techno-
logical solutions.
Carbon markets (cap and trade schemes) and carbon
taxes are the two standard ways of putting a price on
carbon emissions. The major difference between these two
approaches is that carbon markets set the quantity of
carbon to be emitted and let the price vary in the market for
emissions permits, while carbon taxes fix the price but let
the quantity of emissions vary. As such, carbon markets
introduce a price risk for those exposed to the spot price of
permits, while carbon taxes introduce quantity risks on the
climate. Carbon markets and carbon taxes share many of
the same theoretical properties and can be identical in
many respects (see Goulder and Schein, 2013). However
as we shall see, carbon markets are emerging as the more
popular form of carbon pricing globally.
Many societal stakeholders – such as large fossil fuel
based energy companies and many of their larger
customers – do not like carbon markets precisely because
they deal so effectively with the general equilibrium issues
and ensure that the overall quantity of permits is fixed no
matter what the demand conditions are in the market for
permits.
The ways in which they do this are that they are
transparent and highlight: differences between included
and non-included parties; the incidence of final costs and
prices, especially to consumers; the financial flows within
and between countries; the cost impact of political
interventions; the lowest cost interventions, which effec-
tively acts to restrain special interests. Thus if governments
choose to enact limited carbon trading schemes, it will
soon become clear what effect they are having and on
whom. It is also clear when the initial quantities of permits
available in the market are too few or too many by the
evolution of prices, while any announcement on extension
of the current trading scheme will have a verdict given on
its tightness by the price reaction in the permit market.
Basically, political opposition to the use of carbon
markets is based on the fact that they do work in a
predictable way.
2.2 What are the characteristics of a global market?
What would a global carbon market look like? This is an
interesting conceptual question. One might imagine that it
would involve a single type of emissions permit issued by
a global authority and a single global monitoring and
enforcement authority. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) does issue
Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), which approxi-
mately have this property and in some sense already
provide a global carbon price at the moment.
However, in general, global markets do not have this
type of framework. Global markets are actually made up of
voluntarily interconnected markets, which produce and
trade broadly similar products with price arbitrage between
them. The individual markets within the interconnected
system have their own systems of property right definition
and enforcement. A good example of this is the global
market for oil. While one can clearly speak about the
global price of oil and global supply and demand
conditions, actually the global market is made up of a
number of interconnected markets (such as West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) and Brent Crude). These markets give
rise to their own prices (WTI is usually cheaper than Brent,
due to local market factors). The situation in global natural
gas is even less integrated, with major regional markets (in
the US, Europe and the Pacific Basin), but prices do to
some extent move together.
For us to talk about a global market, all that needs to be
true is that markets are interconnected enough for major
price differences between significant regions to be
arbitraged. This clearly does happen in oil and is
happening to an increasing extent in natural gas. A single
trading platform or integrated regional platforms (as for oil,
or foreign currency) are not required, though clearly end-
users can arbitrage between markets for both oil and gas
because the underlying commodity can be used in any
location. The parallel for a global market in carbon
emissions permits is simply that individual markets
recognize a permit from another market as being
exercisable in their market.
The idea of a global market does not require all sectors
of the economy to be exposed to global price fluctuations.
Whole sectors can be exempted from such exposure, either
by contractual hedging with longer-term private contracts
or by government intervention. Thus even in market based
energy systems, energy companies can sign long-term
contracts for the supply of gas or coal which effectively
reduces the exposure of their customers to spot market
fluctuations in international commodity prices. This
happens with carbon when the government buys renew-
ables or nuclear power with multi-year fixed prices above
the expected average long-term market price. It also
happens when governments fix final (i.e. administered)
prices of energy regardless of the fluctuating fossil fuel
price, such as in the many oil producing countries who
choose to sell oil to their domestic consumers at much less
than the world market price equivalent price. By contrast
developed countries with very high taxes on oil products,
such as gasoline, also reduce the exposure of their
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domestic customers to global oil price fluctuations. Doing
this dulls the exposure of the domestic economy by
reducing the demand below what it might otherwise have
been.
Once a global market emerges for any commodity we
might expect the degree of exposure to prices based on the
global market price to increase over time. This occurs
because the costs of non-alignment are likely to grow over
time, especially for countries with abnormally low prices.
These countries are over-consuming the commodity with
the loss of export revenue (if they produce it domestically)
or an increasing import bill. One might expect that internal
prices might converge with international prices over time,
though this process may be very slow. 1)
This process of convergence might also apply to global
carbon pricing, with initially very different approaches to
the determination of national carbon prices giving way
over time to more market integration and price conver-
gence. This would imply that even if countries started off
with initially purely domestically determined carbon
pricing (via, say, a carbon tax), there would be pressure
to align domestic carbon prices with those emerging from
large international carbon markets. Indeed, Stiglitz (2015)
has recently made the case for a hybrid approach with
some countries opting for cap and trade, and others going
for carbon taxes, each as they see fit, as part of a global
solution to GHG emissions.
An effective set of ‘global’ prices, arising from a
reasonably comprehensive attempt to restrict quantities of
emissions using carbon pricing instruments does not
therefore imply a single global price for every tonne of
GHG emissions. While a set of fully linked markets – with
unrestricted trading between them – might be envisaged,
this is clearly not necessary to combat climate change. A
set of separate carbon markets with varying degrees of
linkage2), which in aggregate enforced the required global
quantity of emissions cap, would be sufficient.
2.3 What would be the scale of a global carbon market?
The global oil market provides a good backdrop to
thinking about a global carbon market. The basic
parameters of a global carbon market are the following.
In 2016 the amount of CO2e emissions was around
49000m tonnes3) (of which around c.70% is CO2).
Assume the long run price of CO2e needs to be $100 per
tonne CO2e by 2050 to be consistent with the emissions
reduction target needed. This would suggest that the
market might be worth $4900 bn per year. However this
would overstate the value of the likely carbon market at
any point in time. A plausible long run equilibrium might
therefore be 10000 m tonnes at $80 per tonne4). If 10% of
the value of this market were traded between regional
markets (say US, China, EU etc), this would require global
flows of funds equal to $80 bn p.a. How large is this
market? For comparison, the global oil market is roughly
90 million barrels per day5). At $100 per barrel (which
might be a long run price) this adds up to $3285 bn per
year. Meanwhile looking at the potential financial flows
between regional carbon markets, $80bn is less than the
current global international aid budget (which is $145 bn
p.a.)6).
These numbers suggest that if all GHGs were part of a
global carbon market, then this would be a large market but
not out of all proportion to the sorts of markets that already
exist at the global level.7)
2.4 Creating the global carbon market – is it possible?
There are around 190 states in the world. It would seem
that reaching a global agreement on allocating the quantity
of GHG emissions to each state would seem very difficult,
but global emissions are highly skewed as Table 1 shows.
The top 10 emitters alone, including the European Union,
cover 68% of emissions.
Looking at the G208) + Spain (the group of leading
countries who regularly meet to discuss international
1) Indeed the IEA (2015, pp.96–99) does discuss some evidence that global fossil fuel subsidies are beginning to decline, after adjusting for oil price effects.
2) For a discussion of linking carbon markets see Tuerk et al. (2011).
3) See Olivier et al. (2017).
4) See IPCC (2014, p.21), in the years out to 2070–2080.
5) See BP (2017).
6) See http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/final-oda.htm, accessed 28 February 2018.
7) While a global carbon market is similar in scale to the global oil market. It is different in other ways. Oil from different sub-markets is physically
interchangeable in a way that carbon permits – as legal property rights – are not. Governments need to recognise one another’s carbon permits.
Table 1 Top ten emitters of GHGs globally
(exc. Land use change and forestry (LUCF)) 2016
China 26.5%
United States 13.1%
European Union 9.0%
India 7.4%
Russian Federation 4.5%
Japan 2.8%
Brazil 2.3%
Indonesia 1.9%
Canada 1.8%
Iran 1.7%
Total 71%
Source: Olivier et al., 2017, p.46.
8) The G20 consists of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Spain is a permanent invitee.
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affairs), this covers 85% of world GDP and 78% of world
CO2e (exc. LUCF). If we include the next 10 largest
emitting countries, we get to around 85% of world CO2e. A
reasonably sized initial large carbon market, with border
tax adjustment (Neuhoff and Ismer, 2007)1) would be
sufficient to incentivize emergence of an increasingly
global carbon market drawing in all the largest countries.
How difficult would it be to get 31 countries to agree to
quantitative emissions reduction targets?
The EU ETS has 31 countries participating at the
moment (28 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway and
Liechtenstein). Of the G21, 6 (including the EU itself) are
in the EU ETS. Of the 35 OECD countries, 24 are in the
EUETS. Of the rest of the world, many are in the spheres of
influence of the largest 31 emitting countries. This suggests
that agreeing a reasonably comprehensive agreement on
quantity controls for GHGs is not primarily a problem of
the complexity of the negotiations that might be involved.
This is not to say that such a negotiation is straightforward
– it clearly is not. The EU is clearly not a representative
sample of countries in the world, but what it does exhibit
very well is the power of shared interest on a number of
issues to enforce agreement on a particular issue, where the
majority of countries harbors a strong political position.
2.5 Carbon trading vs carbon taxes?
An important theoretical discussion in environmental
economics relates to the relative efficacy of emissions
trading vs emissions taxes. Should the world attempt to
coordinate on quantity targets for GHG emissions or a set
of reasonably consistent carbon prices (taxes)? Weitzman
(1974) makes a strong case for pollution taxes, which can
be illustrated by the diagram in Fig. 1. He argues that if the
slope of the marginal cost of abatement curve (MC) is
steeper than the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement
curve (MB), then it is better to set a tax than to set quantity
limits if there is uncertainty about the exact position of the
MC curve. This is because the cost of mistakes in the
estimation of the position of the MC curve (cost of
abatement uncertainty) is lower if we get the tax level
wrong than if we get the quantity level wrong, something
that is illustrated by the size of the deadweight loss from
the mistakes in the following diagram:
It may be questioned, however, whether this sort of
argument applies well to GHGs.
The Weitzman result depends on the relative slopes of
two curves, and his analysis suggests that the extreme
cases where the relative cost of setting taxes is higher is
more ‘likely’ than the extreme cases where the cost of
setting quantities is higher. Since we do not really know
where the MB curve is, and since it might involve big
discontinuities in environmental damage (and hence be
very steep in places), that is an argument in favor of
quantity setting (see Fig. 2 where there is no efficiency loss
from a quota). In reality, a lot of uncertainty exists about
the marginal benefit curve (i.e. we do not know where the
climate damage effects exactly kick in, or how societies
will adjust if they do). This is indicated by the wildly
differing estimates on the value of the social cost of carbon
(see Hope and Newbery, 2008).
It is worth pointing out that if there is no uncertainty in
the MC curve, but only in the MB curve, then the cost of
mistakes is the same under both quantity or price setting.
Thus if the marginal cost of abatement is actually relatively
well defined or lower than predicted, then it is unlikely that
the mistake in quantity is worse than the mistake in price.
In practice there is no suggestion that we would ever
seek to impose a single price or quantity limit for all time,
as the model is set up to analyze; instead, we would look to
tighten the pollution control regime over time. This
significantly reduces the cost of mistakes, allowing the
1) Border tax adjustments could impose carbon tax adjustments on imports from countries that choose to remain outside the large carbon trading area.
Fig. 1 Carbon taxes or carbon markets? Weitzman argument:
Costs of errors setting quantities
Fig. 2 The benefit of quantity setting in the presence of cliff-
edge effects in emissions
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incorporation of learning on the position of curves in the
light of further information on the position of the MB and,
especially, the MC curve. Thus a better representation of
the situation is perhaps Fig. 3, where identifying the
optimal price (in the region of the blue ball) is very
difficult, given the uncertainty in both the MC and MB
curves.
Weitzman’s arguments are based on the relative dead-
weight losses arising from price setting vs. quantity setting.
Weitzman (2015) has recently made three additional
arguments in favor of a global carbon tax over a global
quantity cap. These are: That revenues are nationally
collected with a tax; that negotiating one price is easier
than negotiating on quantities; and that governments have
an incentive to coordinate upwards on the tax, rather than
try and reduce the price under a quantity cap by seeking
higher quantities. It is worth addressing each of these in
turn. First, revenues from auctioning permits under carbon
trading can be (and indeed are in the EU ETS) collected
nationally, so this is not in reality a difference. Except that
under central allocation of permits, one can (additionally)
use the national quantity allocation to transfer wealth to
countries bearing heavier costs of adjustment, in a way that
might be easier than under the direct transfer of tax
receipts. Second, the complexity of negotiation point is an
interesting one. This is superficially attractive, but in
international tax coordination, one suspects the devil is in
the detail of implementation in each country and the fact
that the nominal tax rate (in US dollars?) is the same is not
really the issue – it could equally well be different without
any loss of difficulty of implementation. Finally, on the fact
that self-enforcement on a higher tax rate is likely, I am not
sure there is any evidence that countries do coordinate
upwards in negotiations on taxes. The EU carbon tax
experience was that countries could not even agree to
introduce the tax, let alone coordinate it upwards.
Cramton et al. (2015) make a further important
conceptual point in favor of a uniform global carbon tax.
Namely, that it introduces less volatility into the pricing of
carbon and hence into the flow of funds that must
necessarily flow between nations to achieve ambitious
climate goals. Of course, this is an important argument.
However it is easy to overstate the extent to which carbon
prices within a cap and trade system are volatile, relative to
the non-volatility of carbon taxes. Yes, prices in carbon
markets are volatile in the same way as other commodities,
such as oil and gas. However this is a volatility that can be
managed and indeed is managed by long-term contracts,
with the exposure to short run carbon prices ultimately
being quite limited. Carbon taxes may not exhibit daily or
monthly variability, but they can be reduced, increased or
even removed by future government action (c.f. the
Australian carbon tax discussed below). What is more,
carbon taxes can introduce volatility into the outturn
quantity of GHGs released, with consequences for climate
risk.
Goulder and Schein (2013) raise the issue of whether
fossil fuel producers will have different incentives under a
carbon trading scheme or a carbon tax. They suggest that in
the presence of a trading scheme it would be possible for
oil producers to reduce supply to reduce the price of
permits and hence absorb the rent created by the intended
restriction in demand. This cannot happen with carbon
taxation. As they point out, this result rather supposes that
fossil fuel producers have the market power to act in this
way in the face of falling demand. In a strong carbon policy
environment it would seem to be the case that fossil fuels
will be abundant and the ability of fossil fuel producers to
behave strategically is likely to undermined. The greater
worry in this case is likely to be the green paradox1) where
fossil fuel producers, anticipating long run oversupply of
fossil fuels, are likely to increase extraction rates. In this
case quantity targets are likely to be a more efficacious
climate policy than carbon taxation.
There are some other types of arguments that are very
important in favor of carbon trading.
First, there is the importance of consistency between the
recommendations from climate science and the economic
instruments employed to act on that science. Climate
science can and does frame the climate problem as being
about the absolute quantity of GHGs emitted (e.g. Max =
c.1000 Giga Tonnes (GT) of Carbon = c.2440 GT CO2e) if
the rise of significant warming is to be contained (e.g.
Allen et al., 2009). Clearly, emissions trading based on
quantity limitation coordinates the economic framing and
the scientific framing in a way that setting a target price for
carbon emissions does not. Put another way, setting the
right social cost of carbon (via a carbon tax) might give rise
Fig. 3 A better argument? More important (and easier) to
identify dangerous quantity than ‘correct’ price
Source: From Grubb and Newbery, 2008, p. 282.
1) See Sinn (2008).
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to the right quantity of emissions reduction in theory, but
fixing the quantity of emissions directly (as in a trading
system) would be a surer way of meeting the scientifically
determined target.
Second, there are important legal precedents that an
international agreement on emissions reduction must work
within. As we have seen with the global oil market, global
markets can and do exist based on internationally respected
property rights. The idea that commodities and ownership
rights can be traded internationally is well established in
international law. This can happen while respecting
national sovereignty. Thus tradable quantities of emission
permits with initial allocations of pollution rights is
consistent with the current basis of property rights and
trade (as the EU ETS and other international agreements to
respect nationally created property rights demonstrate). By
contrast, co-ordination of taxes across borders is not
something that is consistent with national sovereignty, and
there are no examples globally of co-ordination upwards1)
of environmental or any other tax rates.2)
Third, there is a rather important point to do with the
rebound affects of a carbon tax. It is common to argue that
carbon taxes produce a double dividend, in that higher
carbon (and indeed any environmental taxation) leads to
reduced taxes elsewhere and hence may stimulate the
economy by reducing the inefficiencies associated with
conventional taxes which are leveled on earned income
and are therefore distortionary of work – leisure choices.3)
If environmental tax revenue is then used to target benefits
on lower income consumers (as was the intention in
Australia) this may also stimulate the economy via the
multiplier effect arising from their re-distributional effects.
Both of these types of effects mean that environmental
taxes may raise demand for goods and services and hence
produce some offsetting rise in CO2e emissions. Thus
carbon taxes may not produce as big a reduction in
aggregate emissions as expected. This is not a problem
with quantity restrictions on carbon emissions, where there
is no possibility of a rebound effect being at work in
aggregate.
Fourth, a key advantage of carbon trading is that the
price of carbon dioxide permits is pro-cyclical (i.e. when
GDP growth is faster, prices are higher). This is a good
way of protecting the mechanism at times when the
economy is doing poorly. There are good reasons why this
makes sense from a social cost benefit analysis point of
view, namely that social discount rates rise in times of
recession: This is because inequality aversion goes up and
hence social discount rates rise. Fixed tax rates become
more burdensome and hence difficult to defend in times of
recession, and more vulnerable to being reduced in a way
that undermines the long-term credibility of the carbon tax
mechanism.
Finally, Gollier and Tirole (2015) make an interesting set
of arguments in favor of cap and trade based on the relative
ease of enforcing a global carbon tax vs global quantity
restrictions. Their point is that enforcing a global carbon
tax would be very difficult to monitor. This is because it
would be easy to turn a blind eye to enforcement of
payments from particular polluters where this produced a
national benefit. In addition, other taxes could easily be
adjusted to mitigate the impacts of the carbon tax, in
particular other taxes on fuel. This would undermine the
overall quantity impact of carbon taxes.
2.6 The evidence on carbon emissions trading vs carbon
taxes
The European Union spent five years in the early 1990s
discussing a carbon tax at the EU level.4) It could not agree
on a carbon tax, but it did subsequently agree on
introducing an emissions trading system. Other interna-
tional or multi-jurisdictional systems for carbon pricing
have all made use of carbon trading, notably California and
Quebec under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and
nine states in the US North-east andMid-Atlantic under the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Even within
countries, carbon taxation has proved very difficult to
enact.
This is not only about the sovereignty of governments
with respect to taxation, which they expect to be able to
adjust annually within the budget. It is also about the fact
that tax rates are subject to periodic review, making any
initial scheme vulnerable to subsequent political inter-
ference. In particular, it may be difficult to raise taxes from
their initial levels in order to strengthen the price signal.
Differences in the political cycle mean that it would be
difficult to coordinate increases to tax rates across
countries, in a way that agreements to tighten the quantities
within an emissions cap may not be.5)
Energy taxation on different fuels shows wide variance
within and between countries. This suggests the political
1) There are some good examples of global coordination on the reduction or elimination of tax rates (e.g. as part of the GATT free trade rounds). However co-
ordinating on tax increases is quite a different story. The closest example is perhaps the EU’s effort to co-ordinate VAT rates within the EU, but this is not
about equalizing the VAT rates, and rather about keeping them within bands.
2) Canada is an interesting case study, where different provinces have adopted carbon taxation (e.g. British Columbia) and emissions trading (e.g. Ontario and
Quebec). Recently the federal government announced a policy of moving towards pricing carbon across Canada. Provinces with emissions trading regimes
need to set caps in line with their share of the national targets. Provinces with carbon taxes need to set minimum tax rates. The federal government does not
propose rolling out a single carbon tax across the whole of Canada (see World Bank, 2017, p.45–46).
3) For a discussion see Smith (1998).
4) The carbon tax was proposed in 1992 and finally withdrawn in 1997. The proposed level of the tax was initially $3 per barrel of oil (which is approximately
$7 per tonne CO2) rising at $1 per year to $10 (European Commission, 1992).
5) The EU has recently agreed to tighten its carbon cap out to 2030.
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difficulty of co-ordinating on taxes, given very different
attitudes to energy taxation in general. This is perhaps
because vested interests in many jurisdictions find it easy
to keep taxes at a low level or have been able to secure
substantial exemptions, due to the lack of transparency
around the domestic tax setting process.
Table 2 shows the relative size of the biggest actual and
planned carbon trading schemes in 2016. The coverage for
all carbon trading schemes is about 9% of global GHGs,
which together with carbon taxes, brings about 13% of
GHGs under some form of carbon pricing. By the end of
2020, the coverage of all carbon pricing might be over
20%, of which most would be covered by emissions
trading schemes (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018).
The prices and the coverage of the current schemes
remains low (World Bank, 2017). Prices are often very low
and a long way short of the $80 that might be necessary to
actually help achieve the emissions reductions required. In
the EU ETS, for instance, the price is currently (February
2018) only around $12.34 (10.10 Euros) per tonne of CO2;
in California-Quebec it is $15.28 per tonne of CO2e; and in
RGGI it is $3.80 per tonne of CO2. The global value of
carbon pricing is thus around $50 bn p.a. – a long way
short of the $800 bn envisioned above. Some carbon taxes
are very high (e.g. the Swedish carbon tax is $140 / tonne
of CO2)
1), but these high prices are rare. Emissions
coverage within pricing systems ranges from 20 to 85% of
GHG emissions, and typically amounts to around 40%–
50% (the EU ETS covers 45% of EU emissions). Normally
this will include the power sector and energy intensive
industry (such as steel and cement).
By contrast governments are much keener to subsidise
renewables (via Feed-in-tariffs and Renewable Certificate
Schemes) and fossil fuels by selling them below economic
cost. In 2016 renewable subsidies were $140 bn globally,
while fossil fuel subsidies were $260 bn (IEA, 2017b). At
the moment governments are clearly willing to spend large
amounts of money subsidising energy production and use,
but much less on pollution control.
However the World Bank (2017, p.22–25) has docu-
mented the progress with carbon pricing, and in particular
emissions trading. As of 2017, 42 countries (and 25 sub-
national territories) will have some form of carbon pricing.
This has increased from 2 countries in 1990.
It is important to point out that emissions trading
schemes can be combined with carbon taxes and other
emissions reductions policies, if this is thought to bring
additional benefits over and above a single instrument.
Indeed such hybrid schemes2) are popular. Emissions
trading schemes can have maximum and minimum prices
(e.g. RGGI has a floor price of $2.05), making them look
closer to a tax, and hence reducing price volatility. Carbon
taxes can be imposed on top of or alongside emissions
trading regimes (e.g. several EU ETS countries do this).
This may be desirable if emissions prices are thought to be
to low or if trading schemes – which may be cross
jurisdictional- do not cover certain polluters.
3 Lessons from the EU ETS and the
Australian Carbon Tax
3.1 The EU Emissions Trading System
The EU ETS began in January 2005 and has now been
extended to 2030. It is currently (April 2018) the biggest
emissions trading scheme in the world, covering 11,000
individual stationary sources of emissions in the power and
industrial sectors, as well as aviation within the EU. The
EU ETS has had a chequered history as the evolution of
prices within the mechanism demonstrates3). Prices have
been as high as 30 Euros per tonne of CO2, but are now
around 10 Euros. This is partly a result of the way an
emissions trading system works to minimise the cost of
complying with a given quantity cap within the scheme.
Lower than expected prices are a sign of success in
achieving a given quantity target.
There was an initial collapse of prices toward zero in
2007 due to over allocation of quantities in the initial
trading period (which were not bankable to the second
period from January 2008). This primarily happened
because national governments were able to set their own
quantity targets within the scheme. A second price collapse
occurred in 2009 following the global financial crisis,
which particularly effected EU GDP and demand growth.
However the scheme has continued and has now been
extended from 2020 to 2030.4) The scheme has evolved
Table 2 Example Emissions Trading Scheme sizes
EU ETS 1964 mt p.a. (2015)
China pilot schemes 1115 mt p.a. (2013-14)
Korea 539 mt p.a. (2015)
California-Quebec 490 mt p.a. (2020)
Australia (initially a tax) 283 mt p.a. (2012-13)
RGGI – Eastern United States 56 mt p.a. (2017)
Switzerland 5 mt p.a. (2015)
Total c.9% of global emissions
Source: World Bank (2014), IETA website.
1) World Bank (2017).
2) See Schmalensee and Stavins (2017).
3) See for example: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/eua-future-prices-200520132011/eua-future-prices-200520132011-eps-file/image_ori-
ginal, accessed 28 February 2018.
4) For a discussion of progress with the EU ETS and future directions, see Meadows et al. (2015).
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and been strengthened to some extent. There is now an EU
wide cap with allocation of auction shares to national
governments, preventing the over allocation problem at the
national level. Free allocation of permits to existing
polluters, which comprised most of the permits in the
early trading years, has now been replaced with residual
free allocation to trade impacted sectors, with most sectors
having to buy permits at auction. This reduces the problem
in the power sector of double payment to polluters, who
gained free allocation of valuable permits, plus the ability
to increase electricity rates based on the rise in the marginal
price of power due to the opportunity cost of extra permits
at the marginal price setting plant.
There is a move toward linking the EU ETS with other
emissions trading systems, rather than allowing the
introduction of large numbers of offset reductions from
CER projects. The introduction of large numbers of CERs
served to keep the price down in the initial years. However,
in spite of promising recent developments in the overall
design of the scheme, there remains a substantial overhang
of permits in the market, perhaps as much as one year’s
emissions, banked for future use. This serves to keep the
price low into the future. The EU has decided to introduce
a market stability reserve (MSR) to take some of the
permits out of the market and raise the price in the short run
(and potentially reduce high prices in the future), but the
MSR is small in relation to the size of the overhang of
permits.1)
The most encouraging development spearheaded by the
EU Commission (which is responsible for administering
the scheme) is that, when setting the new 2030 energy and
climate policy targets, carbon emission reduction is now
the center piece of the policy, rather than one of three
potentially conflicting policy goals. Thus the 2030 target
for decarbonisation is a 40% reduction in GHG emissions
(relative to 1990), i.e. a further 25% emissions reduction
relative to the 2020 target in 10 years, implying a 43%
reduction of ETS covered sectors relative to 2005. This is
in addition to an EU-wide renewable energy (RE) target of
32%, which is subject to weaker enforcement than the
current 20% target for 2020, and seems capable of being
delivered by the necessary national efforts to achieve the
decarbonisation target.
Similarly, the energy efficiency target of a 32.5%
reduction in energy use relative to business as usual (up
from 20% in 2020) is also not subject to national
enforcement and is capable of being delivered by the
decarbonisation target.
Ellerman et al. (2010) give an initial and broadly
positive assessment of the EU ETS. They note that carbon
has been priced, and while initial allocation was con-
troversial, emissions did fall by 2%–5% in the early years
of the scheme. Moreover, the market for permits is liquid
and efficient, and the negative effects on traded sectors has
been small. The EU ETS remains an impressive multi-
country environmental policy instrument capable of further
tightening if other jurisdictions agree to also restrict their
emissions, reducing the problem of carbon leakage.
Boasson and Wettestad (2012) label it a good example of
what they call international institutional entrepreneurship,
which clearly established the EU as the leading policy
maker with respect to decarbonisation.
3.2 The Australian Carbon Tax
If the EU ETS provides a broadly positive experience of
carbon pricing generally and carbon emissions trading in
particular, the Australian experience with carbon pricing is
rather different.
The Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) was
introduced as a carbon tax in July 2012 at AUD 23.00. It
rose to AUD 24.15 (c.16 Euros) per tonne of CO2e in
2013–2014, with a view to transitioning to a cap-and-trade
scheme in July 2015. The CPM covered 60% of Australian
emissions. On the face of it, this was an impressive
achievement, which opened up the possibility of linking
Australia with the EU ETS and other cap-and-trade
schemes.
The problem was that the scheme was controversial
from the outset. Unlike in Europe, where there has been a
widespread consensus on the need to do something about
the climate problem and cross-party political support for
carbon emission reductions,2) this was not the case in
Australia. The Clean Energy Act 2011 passed narrowly in
the legislature.3) The then opposition Liberal party
campaigned on a promise to abolish the CPM as one of
their flagship policies. They won the election in 2013, and
the tax was abolished in July 2014.
Robson (2014) offers an interesting analysis of the
failure of the Australian carbon tax, suggesting that other
measures (such as subsidies to renewables) might have
been more effective. In particular, his analysis shows that
although the government did attempt to mitigate the impact
of the tax on voters by substantially recycling the revenue,
this was poorly targeted and most taxpayers were worse off
as a result of the combination of higher energy prices and
lower non-energy tax rates. Robson highlights calculations
which show the effective marginal tax rate going down for
0.56m lower income tax payers, but going up for 2.21m
middle income tax payers. Overall, the fiscal impact was
large, with AUD 27.7 bn (c. $20 bn USD) of taxes being
raised over four years, of which only AUD 15.3bn was
returned to households, with the government fiscal position
actually worsening after taking into account the free
1) See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/index_en.htm Accessed 24 November 2015.
2) In the UK the Climate Change Act 2008 passed its final vote in the House of Commons 463-3.
3) 36-32 in the Senate, see http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2011/November/14111101.aspAccessed 24 November 2015.
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allocation of permits and other measures undertaken.
The failure of the Australian carbon tax highlights once
again that taxes are clearly not superior to cap-and-trade as
a way of reducing price volatility, given that the key to
policy certainty is the political sustainability of any pricing
scheme and the basic economics were not affected by the
lack of daily volatility in carbon prices.1) As Robson points
out, the initial price of carbon was quite high, especially
relative to the wholesale price of electricity. Introducing
the carbon tax produced a sharp spike in wholesale
electricity prices (of around 20%, at a time when prices
were rising), which could have been avoided if the tax had
been introduced at a lower level initially.
4 Signs of progress in the United States
and China
4.1 Progress under the Clean Air Act in the United States?
The US already has a number of regional carbon trading
schemes. Indeed, as of early 2018, no less than 10 US
states are already participating in regional carbon trading.
All of these schemes cover the power sector and have been
the result of state-level initiatives.
The US Congress failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol of
1997 and hence has not signed up to emissions reductions
targets as part of the UNFCCC process so far. The EU, by
contrast, did ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU ETS is a
major part of its policy response. National carbon trading
proposals have been presented in Congress, but so far have
not progressed. These include, for instance, the Lieberman-
McCain Bill in the Senate in 2003, and the Waxman-
Markey Bill in the House of Representatives in 2009.2)
Both of these bills proposed a reasonably comprehensive
carbon market, covering 85% of CO2e emissions, includ-
ing the power sector, industry and transportation.
However, another potential route to a federal carbon
market was pursued, with the support of President Obama,
under existing legislation around the Clean Air Act, which
is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) (see Palmer, 2014).
In 2007, the EPA established its authority to regulate
GHGs under the Clean Air Act, when the Supreme Court
ruled in its favor in a case between it and the US State of
Massachusetts. In 2009, the EPA established that GHGs
were an ‘Endangerment’ to public health and that GHGs
did ‘Cause or Contribute’ to negative environmental
impacts. These rulings established that the EPA was free
to regulate GHGs at the national level. In 2010, the EPA
reached a settlement between various state and environ-
mental petitioners who were demanding that the EPA take
action on GHGs from power plants.3)
The EPA then established a three-part plan for reducing
GHG emissions. This consisted of improvements to mobile
source standards, construction permitting and stationary
sources. The mobile source standards (5% per year to
2025), involve moving the vehicle fleet average fuel
efficiency to 35.5 miles per gallon (mpg) in 2016 to 54.5
mpg in 2025. The construction permitting sees improve-
ments to the energy efficiency of new buildings, to be
implemented by the states. And finally, the introduction of
performance standards for new and existing electricity
generators. This covers around 32% of current emissions.
The first two approaches were set out in 2011, and the
third, known as the EPA Clean Power Plan, was set out in
2014.
The EPA’s approach involved setting out conditions
where a carbon market might emerge as the cheapest way
to meet the emission standards it has set (Environmental
Protection Agency 2014, 2015). To that end, the EPA took
a number of technology building blocks to arrive at a Best
System of Emission Reduction (BSER) standard for each
state out to 2030. These technology building blocks
suggested actions that each US state could take with
respect to its existing fossil fuel plant fleet. The final BSER
standards were arrived at by combining: An improvement
in the heat rate of coal fired power plants; an increase in the
utilization of national gas power plants; and increased use
of zero carbon renewables. The Final Rule published in
October 2015 showed projected power plant emissions
reductions of 32% by 2030, relative to 2005 (Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 2015, p.64924).
At the state level, the BSER translated into proposed
state level goals for adjusted MWh-weighted-average
pounds of CO2 per Net MWh covering all Affected Fossil
Fuel-Fired units. Because the existing mix of fossil fuel
power plants is different the state level goals varied by state
(see some examples in Table 3).
Under the policy each state was to submit a plan for
compliance. State level plans were to be presented to the
EPA by 2016 (with the possibility of a two-year extension)
with the compliance period due to begin in 2022. The
states were free to pursue multiple pathways to compliance
using a CO2 per unit of MWh (rate-based) or a total
emissions (mass-based) standard. They could comply, for
1) 33 This is not to say that taxes cannot be stable or indeed increasing. British Columbia has had a successful carbon tax experience (see Elgie and McClay,
2013). The tax has been increased from CAD 10 in 2008 to CAD 30 in 2012 per tonne of CO2. However, the tax has not been linked with other jurisdictions
(unlike Canada’s provincial emission trading schemes), significantly falls on otherwise gasoline (which is not as highly taxed in Canada as in Europe) and is
significantly about raising revenue. By contrast the UK’s carbon tax on fossil fuels for electricity generation (carbon price floor) was initially due to rise from
its currently level of £18 per tonne of CO2, but has been capped at this level.
2) The Waxman-Markey Bill (the proposed US Clean Energy and Security Act 2009) actually passed 219-212 in the House of Representatives, but failed to
progress in the Senate.
3) The Settlement is available at: http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/12/23/document_gw_02.pdfAccessed 03 December 2015.
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instance, through emissions trading with other states. Thus
states could participate in multi-state plan in order to
achieve their emissions reduction goals.
A key feature of the EPA’s impact assessment of their
Clean Power Plan was that there is substantial net present
value in the social cost benefit assessment of their plan.
Most interestingly half (or more) of the benefits arise from
associated reductions in other types of pollutants (pro-
duced with the CO2) that directly impact on local and
regional health within the United States. Total compliance
costs are estimated to $5–9 billion p.a.. Table 4 shows the
detail for rate-based scheme. Mass-based schemes are
estimated to have lower compliance costs ($3bn p.a. less in
2030) and lower air pollution health co-benefits, but
similar net benefits. This is partly because mass-based
schemes can benefit from (cheaper) demand reduction
measures. Existing state carbon trading regimes are
consistent with a mass-based approach.
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) formed a key part of the
US’s INDC submitted to COP-21 and lies behind the US’s
ratification of the Paris Agreement.1) The EPA’s plan was
however subject to legal and political challenge, modifica-
tion and delay.2)
Unfortunately, President Trump has decided to withdraw
the US from the Paris Agreement3) and consistent with this
the EPA proposed, in October 2017, to repeal the CPP.4) As
of February 2018, repeal seems likely. However the CPP
still provides a blueprint for executive action on climate
change and is in line with previous attempts to introduce a
national carbon market in the US.
4.2 Chinese progress with carbon trading
China is now the world’s biggest emitter of GHGs (26.5%
in 2016) and has been making significant progress with its
carbon policy.5)
The National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC)6)(2013) has stated that China’s climate change-
related goals for 2020 include the following: Reducing
CO2 per unit of GDP by 40%–45% relative to 2005, and
increasing the ratio of non-fossil energy to the consump-
tion of primary energy to 15%. Its previous Five Year Plan
(12th FYP 2011–2015) goals were: to reduce CO2 per unit
of GDP by 17% relative to the end of the end of FYP 11,
and to reduce national energy consumption per unit of
GDP by 16% relative to the end of FYP 11. During the
12th FYP, seven local pilot carbon trading schemes have
been established, following approval from the NDRC in
October 2011, and the intention is to move to a national
carbon market by 2017. These goals have been recently
reaffirmed under the 13th FYP for 2016–2020 that seeks to
reduce CO2 per unit of GDP by 18% and to reduce national
energy consumption per unit of GDP by 15% (relative to
end 2015). China has also ratified the Paris Agreement and
committed to reduce CO2 per unit of GDP by 60%–65% by
2030 (relative to 2005) under its submitted INDC.
The characteristics of the 7 pilot carbon trading schemes
are indicated in Table 5. They all cover the electric power
sector and other heavy industry. For the initial pilot period
2013-2015 emissions were capped at the same annual level
for Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, and capped
at levels requiring a decrease of 4.13% p.a. for Chongqing,
and allowing moderate increases in Guangdong and Hubei
(Xiong et al., 2015). The coverage of sectors varies from 4
sectors in Guangdong to 26 sectors in Shanghai (though all
cover electric power) (Zhang, 2015).
Table 5 indicates that these are large pilots, though the
number of covered entities is small. Zhang (2015) reports
that there has been a high level of compliance with the
scheme in the first year and that there have been some
emissions reductions, though the pattern of trading in the
markets indicates that covered entities are waiting to the
end of the compliance window to buy permits rather than
trying to minimise the cost throughout the trading period.
However, the experience to date shows that the idea of
carbon pricing can work in China.
1) See US Government (2015), INDC Submission, at: http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%
20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf
2) See Carson and Kreilis (2015).
3) The withdrawal was announced on 1 June 2017.
4) See https://www.epa.gov/energy-independence, accessed 28 February 2018.
5) Indeed the US and China have made a joint Presidential announcement about their carbon trading plans. See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change, accessed 03 December 2015.
6) The NDRC is a cabinet level department responsible for state economic development planning and for guiding the restructuring of the Chinese economy.
Table 3 Final State Goals for selected States (lbs CO2 per MWh- rate-
based standard)
State
Interim Goal Final Goal
(2022–2029) 2030
Montana 1534 1305
Kentucky 1509 1286
Illinois 1456 1245
Ohio 1383 1190
Pennsylvania 1258 1095
Texas 1188 1042
New York 1025 918
California 907 828
Idaho 832 771
Source: Environmental Protection Agency (2015, p.64824).
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In December 2017 the NDRC announced the intention
to start a national carbon market.1) The market will initially
include just the power sector, but the intention is to extend
this over time to more industries. The initial coverage will
be around 3500 mt CO2 (75% bigger than the EUETS) and
around one third of China’s total GHGs. Implementing the
market will be a challenge (and explains the expected
delays) given its scale and the relative inexperience in
China with trading emissions allowances.
Air pollution remains a major political issue in China,
which may drive emissions reduction. The health co-
benefits of reduced coal use (by heavy industry) in China
remain very large (around 10% of GDP from excess
mortality)2) and suggest additional momentum behind
emissions reduction that might not be present in other
countries. China has also re-embarked on power market
reform aimed at reducing electricity prices (which are very
high for Chinese industry relative to the United States)
following the publication of the No.9 Document of March
2015.3) This should drive rationalisation of the Chinese
coal industry and reduced investment in new coal fired
generation more likely. The Chinese power sector is
responsible for around 7% of global CO2e emissions.
5 Conclusions
The idea of using the market to deliver carbon reductions is
a potent one relative to the alternatives (notably regulatory
controls through technology and performance standards, or
incentives for low carbon technologies through subsidies
and price supports). Carbon emissions permit trading is a
globally popular form of carbon pricing. A global carbon
market is highly desirable as a low cost way of delivering
emissions reduction: Indeed a reasonably comprehensive
set of carbon markets should be the economic center-piece
of any quantity based target for global GHG emissions,
especially in the early stages toward deep cuts in global
emissions.
We are still a long way from trading carbon in significant
volumes across borders, but once again, there are
encouraging signs that this is happening. The EU ETS
has achieved transboundary trading of carbon in a wide
geographic area. This scheme is capable of being linked
globally and has helped create a significant market for
CDM CERs from developing countries. Carbon does thus
have an opportunity cost in many countries as a result of
the EU ETS.
Australia provides a cautionary tale on the steady
progress of carbon pricing mechanisms. Clearly, distribu-
tional issues need to be addressed within countries, as do
the substantial leakage issues associated with the potential
impact on traded sectors. However, have been encouraging
signs in both the US and China on the potential future
direction of carbon markets within those countries.
There is still a long way to go before we see emergence
of anything like a comprehensive system for pricing of
carbon externalities, built on large national or regional
schemes. There is still considerable doubt as to whether the
piecemeal actions of individual governments with respect
1) See Emily Feng, ‘China moves towards launch of carbon trading scheme’, Financial Times, 19 December 2017.
2) The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (2014, Chapter 4, p.13).
3) See: Deepening Reform of the Power Sector, China State Council, Document #9, March 21, 2015, accessed at http://www.ne21.com/news/show-64821.
html.
Table 5 Key characteristics of the Chinese Emissions Trading Pilots
Shenzhen Shanghai Beijing Hubei Guangdong Tianjin Chongqing
Start of operation 2013 2013 2013 2014 2013 2013 2014
Carbon intensity target
2011-2015
-21% -21% -18% -17% -19.5% -19% -17%
Threshold > 20000 t CO2 > 20000 t CO2 > 20000 t CO2 > 60000 t CO2 > 20000 t CO2 > 20000 t CO2 > 20000 t CO2
Initial Year Allowances 33mt 160mt 50mt 324mt 388mt 160mt 125mt
Entities covered 635 191 490 138 242 114 184
Emissions covered 38% 50% 50% 35% 42% 60% 35-40%
Offsets 10% 5% 5% 10% 10% 10% 8%
Free initial allocation c.95% 100% c.95% c.90% c.97% 100% 100%
Penalties 3X market price 10-100k CNY 3-5X market price 3X market price 3X market price NA 2X market price
Source: World Bank 2014, p.122; Xiong et al., 2015, p.2511, 2513; Zhang, 2015.
Table 4 Summary of Estimated Monetized Benefits, Compliance Costs
and Net Benefits for the Proposed Guidelines in 2030 (billions of 2011$)
Rate-Based Plan 3% discount rate
Climate Benefits 20
Air pollution health co-benefits 14–34
Total compliance costs 8.4
Net Benefits (with climate benefits at
3% discount rate)
26–45
Source: Environmental Protection Agency (2015, p.64680).
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to emissions (as represented by the current set of INDCs)
will ever add up to the necessary amount of emissions
reductions that climate science claims to be necessary.1)
While establishing the amount of emissions required and
dividing it up acceptably between countries requires an
enormous scientific and international negotiations effort,
the economic instruments to deliver the agreed targets are
readily at hand.
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